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At its sitting of 11 March 1981, the European Parliament referred the 
motion for a resolution tabled by Mr COSTANZO and others, on financial 
frauds against the Community caused by misuse of financial mechanisms (Doe. 1-973/80), 
to the Committee on Budgetary Control. 
At its meeting of 23-25 November 1981, the Committee decided to draw up a 
report and appointed Mr GABERT rapporteur. 
The Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 9-10 November 1981, 
3-4 December 1981, 28-29 January 1982, 23-24 February 1982, 17-18 May 1982, 
23-24 June 1982, 21-22 September 1982, 2 November 1982, 15-16 February 1983, 
24-25 February 1983, 23-25 March 1983, 24-25 May 1983, 26-28 September 1983, 
29-30 September 1983, 21-22 November 1983 and 24-25 January 1984. 
At its meeting of 25 January 1984, the Committee adopted the draft report by 
8 votes to nil, with one abstention. 
The following took part in the vote: 
Mr AIGNER, chairman; Mrs BOSERUP and Mr PRICE, Vice-Chairmen; Mr GABERT, 
rapporteur; Mr ARNDT (deputizing for Mr WETT!G), Mr BATTERSBY, Mr GONTIKAS, 
Mr KELLETT-BOWMAN, Mr LANGES (deputizing for Mr NOTENBOOM), Mr SABY and 
Mr Konrad SCHON. 
The report was tabled on 30 January 1984. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report is shown on the agenda of 
the part-session at which it will be considered. 
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A 
The Committee on Budgetary Control hereby submits to the EurOpean Parlia.ent 
the following .otion for a resolution together wfth explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
\ 
on frauds against the Ca..un1ty ~udget 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to the motion for a resolution (Doe. 1-973/80), 
- having regaro to the repo~t ·Of the Committee on Budgetary Control (Doe. 1-1346/83), 
- whereas frauds against the Community budget are often closely related to 
other cases of fraud and criminal activities such as frauds relating to the 
quality of products, tax evasion at national level, etc., 
1. Expresses its concern at the fact tha~becauae of inadequacies in Community 
legislation, the lack of harmonization of national laws and regulations and, 
in many cases, the lack of administrative machinery, Large sums of money 
have been Lost as a result of fraud against the Community; 
2.-Stresses that this fora of cr1•inal 1cttvity ts parttcuL•rly concentr1ted 
in areas where 
<a> the administrative structure is weak, 
(b) the prosecution of fraud 11 less ri gorou1, 
.. 
(c) the Community financial mechanisms constitute an additional incentive 
to frCJud, 
3. Expects the Member States to monitor Community finances with the same care 
as they monitor nat.ional financing aa it 11 a queatton of taxpay~rs' 1100ey 
in both cases; 
4. Draws the attention of the Council to the fact that Community financial 
legislation should take account not only of the balance between national 
interests but primarily of Con~unity interests. These include eff~ctive 
control•· 
' 
• 
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5. Stronqly deplores the excessive length of time needed by the Council of Ministers to 
adopt Legislation to combat fraud; 
6. Calls on the Council to adopt immediately the Commission proposals 
before it which have been endorsed by Parliament, particularly in the field 
of mutual aid between the Member States and the Commission in carrying out 
checks and recoveringCommunity monies wrongly paid out; 
7. Deplores the fact that the Council and the Member States have so far been 
unable to plug various Loopholes in the Treaties and have thus prevented 
Community resources being treated as public monies in all Member States so 
that in cases of violations of Community interests responsibility would be 
allocated on the basis of the same principles of civil and criminal Law 
throughout the Community; 
8. Notes that the Commission is endeavouring to harmonize the national interpret-
ations of concepts of Community Law but regrets that the work on such 
harmonization is taking so Long; 
9. Supports the ~fforts by the Commission to standardize regulations and define 
responsibilities for combating frauds and applying controls in all sectors; 
10. Stresses that in cases where immediate measures are needed to protect 
Community interests, the Commission should be empowered to carry out on-the-
spot checks in the Member States without prior notification and asks the 
Commission to submit proposals to this effect; calls once again for what 
might be termed a 'flying squad', consisting of officials frcm the Commission 
and national administrations, to be set up; 
11. Notes that in countless cases the Community has only been able to recover 
payments wrongly made as a result of fraud after considerable time and with 
great difficulty and urges that the Commission's powers in this respect 
should be strengthened; 
12. Points out that the delay in controls and investigations by the Community may 
prevent prosecution in criminal and civil courts; calls therefore. for instances 
ot fraud to be identified promptly; 
13. Calls on the member States to make every effort to harmonize their 
criminal Law in this field and their respective provisions concerning 
the period within which actions must be brought; 
14. Requests the Commission when submitting the 1985 budget to increase the 
resources and staff to combat fraud; welcomes the willingness of national 
courts of auditors to work together with Community institutions to· combat 
fraud; 
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1 ~ Believes that the Court of Auditors of the European Communities should be 
consulted systematically to ensure greater account of monitoring aspects 
when Legislation concerning the various financial mechanisms is being adopted; 
16. Welcomes the special report of the Court of Auditors on the financial 
management of Community activities COJ No. C 287, 24 October 1983) and 
believes that this study has made a major contribution to combating fraud 
against the Community budget; 
17. Calls on the Commission and Council to embark on negotiations with those third 
countries which in practice offer a sanctuary to organizers of economic 
crime by virtue of their extradition regulations; 
1 a Stresses that tax evasion in Member States concerning VAT affects the 
distribution of the tax burden between citizens in the various Member States 
and further exacerbates the problem of financing the Community budget; 
1 Y. Calls on the Commission together with national authorities to produce with 
the assistance of the COOIIU1ity Statistical Office estimates of the Level of fraud 
involving VAT in each Member State, on the basis of which the Cornmunity's 
share of the proceeds of VAT Levied in each Member State could be revised, 
20· Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of its 
committee to the Court of Auditors, the Council and the Commission and 
the Governments of the Member States. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. The European Parliament has been concerned for some time at frauds 
against the Community budget, for two reasons: 
- Firstly, these frauds, the extent of which is often exaggerated, 
have an impact on public opinion; they aggravate doubts about the 
effectiveness of COOIIU'lity financing ard its objectives. 
- Secondly, certain features of the Community's administrative system 
have given rise to a specific type of fraud, against which the 
institutions responsible are often powerless. 
2. This report covers the roles of the Commission, the Council of Ministers 
and national governments in identifying and pursuing frauds. The 
European Court of Anitors sometimes uncovers irregularities and frauds 
in monitoring implementation of the budget. It does not however conduct 
any special investigations. A special investigation is only undertaken 
in particular cases if a special report of the European Court of 
Auditors is c alleci for, as for example in the so-called 'Como Affair'. 
3. The Committee on Budgetary Control, which has been continuously con-
fronted with this problem since it began its work, has decided initially 
to submit a report on the extent of frauds, and subsequently to propose 
a set of measures to combat them more effectively. 
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I. Special features of fraud in the Community 
4. There have always been people who have tried to take advantage of the 
mechanisms of public finances. They have done so by seeking out and 
abusing weaknesses in monitoring systems. Fraud is thus a permanent 
problem. The financial activities of the Community have, however, given 
rise to a type of fraud that displays certain peculiar characteristics: 
5. The first characteristic of fraud obviously relates to the sector in 
which it takes place. Some 70% of Community financial activity relates 
to agricultural policy. It mostly consists in measures to support and 
regulate markets. Fraud in the Community is thus often bouna up 
with the complexities of the Comruon Agricultural Potty. 
1n fact, most frauds against the Community budget that are reported 
to the institutions of the Community relate to the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section, price-adjustment levies, monetary compensatory amounts, refunds, 
intervention , subsidies, etc. 
6. Other areas of Community activity are of course also affected. The fact 
that there is less publicity surrounding these other frauds can be 
accounted for inasmuch as Community activities in these areas are less 
prominent, and that the relevant information-systems and counter-
measures are Less highly developed than in the agricultural sector. 
7. A further characteristic of Community fraud is its transfrontier 
character. One of the Community's major objectives has of course been 
to establish a common market, thereby reducing or eliminating differences 
between national markets. This has given rise to highly complicated 
Legislation. AS distinct fr~ olo-fashiQ"'e(J smuggling, these forms of 
Community fraud are characterized by a series of cases that are some-
times known as the Community 'roundabout'. 
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8. One form of fraud relates to the subsidies that are granted in many 
areas for structural policy measures. These frauds, which have in 
fact Long been known to the Member States, take advantage of the 
fact that objectives and procedures are determined centrally at 
European Level. Here, too Little account is taken of the fact that 
the resources and administrative structures necessary for implementing 
these measures are not entirely appropriate or adequate at national 
LeveL. The measures taken Lnder the EAGGF f-t.Jidance Section are an exception to this. 
Differences in national administrative structures will continue to be an obstacle to 
uniform application of Community legislation for some time. 
9. Finally, fraud in the Community is highly technical. It presupposes 
a thorough knowledge of both legislation and administrative structures, 
as well as of marke~ and market movements. Irregular gains on a 
Large scale can only be achieved through Large-scale organization· 
10. The Commission departments concerned collect and analyse in detail 
all reported cases of fraud. National monitoring authorities have 
also accumulated extensive experience in this area in conjunction 
with the European Court of Justice. Most techniques of fraud are 
therefore familiar. 
11. 
(a) Small-scale fraud 
The most widespread frauds involve submission of false declarations. 
They are difficult to analyse if the amount involved is under ECU 
1,000, since the Member States are not then required to report. 
If fraud on this scale is not rigorously combatted, 
spread rapidly. A typical example is given by fraud 
it can 
involving 
the payment of premiums to restr1ct milkproduction and stabilize 
the market in beef and veal. This mainly concerr.s premiums for 
- 10 - PE 80.370 /fin. 
12. 
slaughter and for the non-marketing of milk. Numerous cases of 
fraud have been reported in various Commission reports since 19761• 
There were press reports at the time of up to 1,000 cases, in 
particular in 1reland and in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Premiums were paid repeatedly for slaughtering the same animal, or 
were paid in respect of animals not eligible for them under Community 
legislation, or slaughter premiums were paid in respect of animals 
sola into intervention. 
2 Reports by the Commission and by t~e special investigation ~earn have 
identified the loopholes giving rise to these frauds: 
- inadequate methods and resources on the part of national adminis-
trations implementing and monitoring the measures; 
- discrepancies in the arrangements for implementing payment of 
premiums as between Member States; 
- loopholes or inadequacies in Community legislation. 
13. The Community departments informed the Member States of the 
risk of fraud and proposed measures necessary to combat it3 • In 
the course of 1980 numerous cases of fraud were again reported 
in the same areas and with approximately the same causes as 
irregularities committed over the preceding three or four years. 
In the inter1m some programmes ha a expired. But funds were still 
being paid out in respect of these programmes. The reasons were: 
- discrepancies in arrangements for authorizing payment of 
premiums as between the Member States; 
1 COM<76) 131 
2 The role of this investigation team has been taken over by Financial Control 
3 COM<76) 370 final, p. 90 
COM(77) 220 and 221 
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- national administrations poorly prepared for 
duties in implementing Community legislation; 
- Community Le~1slation is too complicatea. 
14. The reports by Mr Patterson for the European Parliament's 
Committee on Budgetary Control outline the difficulties of 
carrying out monitoring procedures on the Irish border, and 
estimate the extent of frauds in this connection in 1980 as 
some ECU 10 million1• 
15. Fraud is not,ot crurse, confined to slaughter premi urns, but ~lies also 
to monetary compensatory amounts for almost all agricultural 
products, and to aid for butter consumption. Mr Patterson's 
forceful approaches to the relevant departments in the Member 
States concerned appear to have haltea these practices. 
16. The Court of Auditors of the Federal Republic of Germany 
refers in its annual report for 19792 to payments of premiums 
for non-marketing of milk between July 1977 and March 1981 on 
the basis of a Commission report. It notes that malpractices 
in certain L~der <the same ones as some y~ars oefwte, namely 
Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein) affected some 
80% of premiums paid. 
Doe. 1-100/82, p. 139 
2 p. 98 ff. 
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17. As a consequence of these manoeuvrings, not only premiums but also 
subsidies and Loans were granted in respect of animals or farms excluded 
not eligible under the Le~islation in forcP. The Federal Court of 
Auditors in the Federal Republic of Germany considered that these 
irregularities were essentially attributable to inadequate preparation 
of the departments responsible for the administration of these premiums. 
Lack of clarity in the objectives of Community Legislation also played a 
major part. It was for example not sufficiently clearly stated whether 
priority should be given to reducing milk production or securing farmers' 
incomes. Measures SLWC>rted by the Marrber States when the Legislation is being drafted 
cannot then be inplemented because of inadeqJate preparation by national administrations. 
18. At its meetings in November 1981 in Munich and Frankfurt the Committee on 
Budgetary Control heard all the parties concerned and continued its work 
in cooperation with the European Court of Jluditors. It too came to share 
the view of the German Federal Court of Auditors that the national admin-
istrations could not be expected to implement the relevant measures strictly 
and accurately if there were difficulties with the overall objectives and 
purposes. The solution to the problem should be a global one, as Mr Key 
stated in his report on the discharge for 1980: 
'The checks carried out by Parliament and by the ECA (European Court of 
Auditors) show that a series of EAGGF measures are partly or totally 
ineffective. • •• This comes about in the context of the annual price-
fixing for agriculture when Less account is taken of the interest of the 
EEC than of transfers between Member States. This gives rise to criticism 
- not of the CAP - but of the way it is managed. The Committee on 
Budgetary Control is convinced that Parliament should have available to it 
an ECA study which would indicate clearly 
(i) which are the measures which could be more effective if a more 
rigorous system of management were applied: 
<ii) which measures are so pointless as to warrant being eliminated 
completely; and 
(iii) what are the mechanisms that cause Loss for the EAGGF guarantee 
1 
sector.' 
19. The Commission has since submitted proposals for the reform of European 
Agricultural Policy. The results are still not available to the rapporteur. 
1 This has now been published: OJ No. C 287, 24 October 1983 
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The European Court of Auditors has also conducted an investigation into 
the problem of slaughter premiums for beef and veal which will eventually 
be considered by the Committee on Budgetary Control. 
(b) Organized frauds 
20. If the situation where national government departments have neither the 
means to implement Legislation and monitor its application, nor a clear 
conception of the objectives to be pursued~ontinues over a number of years, 
not only will there be multiple frauds, they will become systematically 
organized. There will be a move into wholesale economic crime. 
21 • 1 Since 1975 the Commission's special investigation party has stressed for 
example the difficulties of monitoring in the olive oil aids sector. A 
study carried out by the Commission in 1972 estimated that 20% of Community 
aid in this area had been granted irregularly. The difficulties of monitor-
ing Lay principally in the Large number of producers and mills. The work-
ing party made the following recommendations2 
abolition of payment of premiums to third parties; 
stepping up controls on oil production in mills and on producers' 
premises; 
improved administration and book keeping by producer cooperatives. 
22. These recommendations had Little success, for the situatia; 1r1 11J&l/~1 was Little 
changed. The Italian authorities had to investigate frauds on a grand 
scale. A number of producers had arranged with certain mills to receive 
higher aid payments by submitting ex~rated data for quantities of oil 
and olives. 
23. In August 1983 the Commission asked the Council of Ministers to provide 
it with the necessary Legal basis to bring fraudulent olive oil producers 
to heel. The Council of Ministers has still not reached a decision. The 
Commission has adopted the European Parliament's proposals. The Commission 
has determined that Italy, for example, with 1.2 million olive producers, 
200 million olive trees and 8,000 oil mills to monitor, is completely over-
whelmed. In 1981/82 applications were made for production aids initially 
for 800,000 and subsequently for 650,000 tonnes of harvested olive oil, 
1 COM(75) 37 
2 !bid p. 9 
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whereas recorded Community consumption amounted to only 450,000 tonnes. 
The experts assume that 200,000 tonnes of this olive oil exist only on paper. 
The chief culprit is the system of global estimates introduced by the 
Member States. 
24. The same basic situation is repeated intaMtoes and in fruit and vegetable 
production generally <see Gabert report Doe. 1-27 /83). A recent investi-
gation was concluded with the arrestof 52 producers. It was estaolished 
that Community aid had been granted to a Large number of farms on the basis 
of falsified documents following oral agreements between producers and 
dealers. 
25. Irregularities have also been establisheo in the organization of the market 
in wine. Some types of organized fraud require a prior agreement between 
two firms~nd in France for example two firms did in fact cooperate in 
'converting' cheap wine into quality wine. 
26. Occasional fraud is often committed by those who have daily contact with 
European Legislation and therefore have first-hand knowledge of its Loop-
holes and weaknesses. There is thus a great temptation to take advantage 
of the Latter. A classic case is that of a major firm in the cereals trade 
which exported cereals from Denmark to the Federal Republic of Germany via 
the United Kingdom in order to take advantage of variations in compensatory 
amounts between Denmark and Britain. 
The European Court of Justice has condemned this practice in a recent 
judgment. 
(c) European organized crime 
27. A new Level of criminality is reached when a Large organization is set up 
in order to make irregular gains at the Community's expense. The worst 
example of this is the so-called 'Coma-Butter' affair. This operation was 
conducted in a number of countries including the Member ~ates France, 
Italy and the Netherlands. During 1974/75 Large quantities of butter were 
dispatched from the German Democratic Republic or other East-bloc countries 
to Rotterdam, sometimes by the direct route and sometimes via Switzerland 
or Belgium. A person resident in Switzerland who managed two Swiss firms 
arranged for the butter to be delivered to various destinations in the 
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north of Italy in ~ench lorries. Since the butter originated outside 
the Community, price-adjustment levies should have been payable •. This 
was avoided by the use of forged certificates and customs documents. A 
total of nearly 7,000 tonnes of butter was involved representing a loss 
to the Community budget of ECU 8.25 million. The European Court of 
Auditors delivered a detailed opinion on this case in its special report 
RS 7/82, and also gave instructions as what action should be taken to 
prevent similar frauds from being perpetrated in the future. 
28. A notorious method of perpetrating these frauds against the Community is 
the so-called 'roundabout' where the same goods cross a frontier repeatedly 
collecting a subsidy or a customs exemption each time. The experience of 
Community and Member-state departments consulted by the rapporteur show 
that this kind of European-organized crime can spread, because it can 
take advantage of the weaknesses of European legislation such as: 
Loopholes and lack of clarity in legislation; 
inadequate pursuit of offenders; 
insufficient cooperation between the Member States; 
the extremely favourable situation of border1ng third countries; 
inadequate administrative and monitoring provisions, e.g. frontier 
controls in Ireland and the Benelux countries. 
29. Experience shows that the Community's agricultural policy has no monopoly 
of frauds, and that many other sectors of the Community are also hit. These 
include the Social Fund, the Regional Fund, the ECSC, food aid, customs 
duties, etc. 
Compared with frauds in the agricultural sector, it is typical of frauds 
in the social and regional policy sectors that virtually all cases uncovered 
are at national leve~and that controls by the Community have scarcely 
ever revealed any irregularities. 
30. Frauds in the areas of food aid and development aid generally display 
different features. These problems are dealt with specifically in a report 
by the European Court of Auditors of October 19801• Where third countries 
1 Special report on Community food aid, 30 October 1980 
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are concerned, the responsibility and monitoring capacity of Community 
departments is obviously Limited. Yet in the view of the Court of Auditors, 
some on-the-spot monitoring activity is necessary. Monitoring of this 
kind by the Community would ensure that Losses and embezzlement of sometimes 
considerable portions of Community food aid could be curtailed. One 
monitoring operation by the European Court of Auditors in a recipient 
country revealed, for example, that of 1,000 tonnes of cereals delivered 
free of charge by the Community, 44% had disappeared in transit or had 
spoilt in storage. Some was sold at reduced prices to the armed forces, 
and some was used to pay motor-vehicle maintenance bills. In another 
country visited a major part of aid was diverted from humanitarian purposes 
and used for the personal enrichment of certain prominent personalities. 
One of these personalities was ordered to repay ECU 6.8 million. The need 
for monitoring applies equally to routine aid, and not merely to emergency 
food aid. The Irmer report adopted by Parliament calls on the Council to 
take all necessary measures. 
31. Combating VAT fraud poses a number of special problems for the Community 
that will be dealt with later. Cases of tariff frauds are reported 
regularly to the Community. On a visit to the main Hamburg customs office 
the chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Control, Mr Aigner, learned 
that importers were taking advantage of ambiguities in the common customs 
tariff by making false statements and, for example, adding token quantities 
of, say, pepper in order to have turkeymeat classified under a more favour-
able tariff heading. 
32. Statistics on the extent of frauds are difficult to compile and must be 
used with caution. Firstly, undiscovered cases of fraud can obviously only 
feature in statistics as estimates of doubtful value. In individual 
Member States the categories of 'fraud' and 'discovered fraud' are defined 
differently. This leads to major discrepancies in the statistics that 
are submitted to the Commission. In particular the fact that the Federal 
Republic of Germany reports the largest number of cases is far from meaning 
that economic crime involving EEC funds is more prevalent there than in the 
other Member States. On the contrary, it means that fraud is combatted 
there more intensively and the category of 'fraud' is more strictly defined 
there than elsewhere. 
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33. If the official figures submitted by the Member States to the Commission 
are taken as the basis for an estimate, a very low fraud-rate of 0.14% 
emerges for the EAGGF Guarantee Section <70% of the Community budget). In 
other words, on a total expenditure of ECU10,9SU million in 1981, the 
Member States reported frauds totalling ECU 15 million. 
Even if the reported figures from the Federal Republic of Germany- whose 
monitoring procedures are widely acknowledged - is taken as the basis for 
the estimate, the resultant fraud rate is only 0.61%. This figure is 
matched by the results of yet another estimate calculated on the basis of 
a method set out in a study by the Ministry of Justice in France, accord-
ing to which Known cases of fraud account for 0.67% of expenditure. 
These figures are thus lower than those for tax evasion against national 
revenues. The fundamentally different nature and composition of national 
budgets as compared with the budget of the Community means however that 
such comparisons have little value. 
34. In contrast to activities in the Member States, frauds and irregularities 
at European level bring the objectives and indeed the very existence of 
the Community policy concerned into question. It is not long before 
the quite justified question is being asked as to whether these frauds 
and irregularities are - at least partly - attributable to inadequacies 
in Legislation. This can then give rise to a conflict over the desirabil-
ity of such legislation, or over the content of the policy concerned as a 
whole, or indeed over the whole istitutional set-up of the Communities. 
35. Frauds committed against the Community budget in fact serve to highlight 
the basic difficulties facing Europe and European statesmen: 
how is a common market to be established and administered if 
national economies and currencies keep tending in the contrary direction? 
how can legislation be created for the Community if it is implemented 
by national administrations using different methods, principles and 
structures? 
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36. Efforts to combat fraud keep running up against these difficulties. Whereas 
responsibility for implementing the Community budget rests with the Commission, 
administration and monitoring of measures financed from its appropriations 
have been entrusted to the Member States. To help resolve this ambiguity, 
the Commission, sometimes with the support of judgments of the European 
Court of Justice, has acted to l.leterr.tine, in combatting 
fraud, whether the Member States have, in accordance with their own 
principles and procedures 
(a) secured legally and organizationally satisfactory implementation of 
the measures financed; 
(b) prevented and pursued cases of fraud; 
(c) called for amountsowed to be repaid. 
37. Unfortunately the Commission has little facilities to enable it to live 
up to its responsibilities for implementing the budget even at this modest 
level. As in many other areas, the Member States have evacuated this respon-
sibility of all content, since the authority for implementation lies with 
them. 
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II. Means available to the Community to combat frauds and irregularities 
38. The measures available to the Community to combat irregularities, Like the 
powers of the Commission, vary considerably from sector to sector. In 
the best case - EAGGF - the Member States are required to inform the 
Commission regularly of cases of fraud that they have discovered. The 
Commission then has the option of calling for additional investigations, 
or of pursuing further investigations itself jointly with the national 
authorities. 
39. The Commission can also discover irregularities on the basis of documents 
submitted under the procedure for the closing of the annual accounts, but 
this only takes place some years after the financial operations themselves. 
Demands for arrears going back a number of years can however have an 
extremely destructive impact on those concerned, so that this method is not 
recommended. The European Court of Auditors has also taken a highly 
critical view of this method. The proced.Jre could be expedited without ll"dermining 
the system itself. 
In other areas such as own-resources, and regional or social policy, the 
obligation on the Member States to report is much Less precise,or indeed non-
existent, and the Community depends totally on monitoring by national 
departments. 
40. A further obstacle to combating frauds against the Community budget arises 
from the division of responsibilities between the national administrations 
and the Community departments concerned: although the Commission has final 
responsibility for implementation of the Community budget, and is therefore 
under an obligation to supervise the correctness of implementation measures, 
responsibility for combating fraud Lies, in the first instance, with the 
Member States. This arrangement has some advantages: 
41. This method allows best use to be made of the vast experience of national 
administrations in combating fraud without having to create a new and 
cumbersome administrative structure. It had also been hoped that this 
would avoid overlapping of monitoring procedures. However, since monitoring 
is ultimately carried out on behalf of and in the interests of the Community, 
an additional Community procedure had to be introduced to monitor national 
monitoring. The Community monitoring service endeavours, with scant 
resources, to reduce the disadvantages of Location of responsibility 
for monitoring at national level. 
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- Differences between national administrative and legal structures lead to 
considerable discrepancies in the application of Community financial 
mechanisms. 
- Differences in the intensity and effectiveness of national monitoring 
procedures have a negative impact on the willingness of national 
administrations to apply strict monitoring procedures that could put 
their own country at a disadvantage. 
42. Efforts to combat fraud at Community level are also compromised by the 
division of responsibilities within the Commission. Monitoring duties -
verification of authorization of measures, verification of their suitability, 
prevention and combating of irregularities, systems monitoring, pursuit 
and collection of amounts owed - are spread over different departments. 
Even if there is good coordination and cooperation between these departments, 
they still have their different standpoints and priorities, whereas measures 
to combat fraud can only be effectively pursued as a joint objective. 
An overall view of the resources available to the Community to combat 
fraud is nevertheless possible, subject to these reservations,under 
t:ht' lleC:Ioings of 
owed. 
A. Prevention 
prevention, pursuit, aro collection of amounts 
43. The Commission has relatively more resources at its disposal for prevention 
than for the pursuit of frauds. The priorities thus established are in 
line with its responsibilities as the guardian of Community law and as the 
institution holding the right of initiative. 
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44. The Commission's central position clearly makes it the most suitable body 
for coLLecting all information on frauds against the Community budget. 
Information is collected more or less systematically sector by sector: 
45. In the EAGGF sector the Member States are required to report known cases of 
fraud to the Commission and to inform the latter regularly as to current 
procedures for the recovery of amounts owed. 
evaluates these reports. 
The Commission analyses and 
The Commission's Financial Controller carries out pointed monitoring in 
the EAGGF and other sectors in an effort to identify weaknesses in the 
system. The information secured in this way is of value to the Commission 
principally in preparing appropriate proposals to improve legislation. 
The Commission has used this method - in the EAGGF sector - in 
setting up a number of special investigating parties on the organization 
of the market in different products, such as olive oil, beef and veal, 
dairy products, or cereals, to determine the main causes of the most wide-
spread frauds in each sector. These investigating parties, composed 
jointly of Commission and Member-State officials, have performed an 
extremely valuable task and have made a significant contribution to 
ensuring that legislation concerning the relevant sectors has increasingly 
come to be considered from the point of view of its vulnerability to 
fraud, and increasing priority has been \,liven to this viewpoint. 
46. In the sector of own resources the Commission has much less detailed 
information on fraud than in the EAGGF sector, sinceRegulation 2891/77 
requires the Member States to report twice yearly in general terms to 
the Commission on problems that have arisen. 1 
The Commission has proposed that the EAGGF information system should be 
applied also to the own-resources sector <see Notenboom report, 
Doe. 167/79). The Council has not yet reached a decision. 
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47. The data and experience gathered by the Commission are systematically 
classified and used, in the first instance, to brief Commission and 
Member-State officials on the most recent problems in implementing 
Community legislation, on the techniques of fraud being perpetrated, and 
on the sectors most at risk. 
Contacts between Commission officials and those from the national 
adm~nistrations are held regularly in the different departments. The 
Commission has also for some years been running a programme to train 
national officials involved in monitoring and implementing EAGGF 
legislation. The rapporteur emphasizes the value 
if they are carried out thoroughly. 
of these measures 
48. This accumulated experience is naturally also used by the Commission in 
preparing legislation concerning implementation of the different 
Community financial instruments. This in fact takes place systematically 
on the basis of a proposal by the special investigating party. 
49. For some years the financial controller has been consulted on all 
proposals concerning legislation with financial consequences, in order 
that the impact and experience of control procedures could be evaluated. 
It is still too early to say whether this procedure has been successful. 
Its limitations are however obvious as soon as the Commission seeks any 
particular legislation, for there it can only make proposals. The 
decisions are taken by the Council on the basis of political considera-
tions where the requirements of monitoring procedures and their 
effective implementation can play only a secondary role. 
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so. 
B. Pursuit 
Although responsibility for investigating and pursuing cases of fraud 
against the Community budget is basically entrusted to the national 
administrations, it nevertheless remains a duty of the Community. The 
national administrations carry it out on behalf of the Community. The 
Commission must in particular meet its general responsibility for 
implementation of the Community budget, and ensure, or at least try to 
guarantee, that cases of fraud are pursued by the national authorities 
in such a manner as to give full weight to the Community's interests. 
If necessary, the Commission must intervene directly. The means 
available to it for doing so however vary widely from sector to sector. 
The Commission exercises this responsibility at three levels: 
1. Coordination of monitoring by the Member States 
51. The Community and the Member States came early to the realization that 
this extreme decentralization of monitoring procedures had a highly 
unfavourable impact on the full and due implementation of Community 
tinancinc;_; arrangements, and could give rise to repeated frauds 1• 
52. In order to reduce this risk at Least partly, it was decided that the 
national departments responsible for monitoring would cooperate with 
each other and with the Commission, and that the Commission would assume 
a coordinating function and collect and distribute the information 
obtained. 
This involved the so-called mutual support: 
- in collecting amounts owed in the EAGGF and customs-duty sectors 
(Directive 76/308) 
~second recital of Directive 76/308, OJ L 73, 19 March 1976, p. 18 
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- in implementing EAGGF and customs-duty legislation (Regulation 1468/81) 
~3. These texts are confined to certain aspects of implementation of Community 
legislation. It is clear however that national legislations themselves, 
and national legal and administrative structures,must be harmonized if 
effective implementation of Community financial instruments is sought. 
If necessary, appropriate legal structures must be established at 
Community level. 
54. Even if national administrations are responsible for implementation and 
monitoring of Community financial mechanisms, Community funds are not 
distributed without a minimum of formalities and monitoring at Community 
level. The Commission thus has the option of preventing Community 
funds from being dis·bursed for purposes not provided for or on account 
of irregularities. This monitoring takes place in particular when 
(a) the Commission's Financial ~ntroller endorses the various stages 
of the budge~ although he only checks the availability of resources, 
and 
(b) the appropriate Commission department processes the documentation 
for the release of appropriations. 
Monitoring is particularly intensive just before the measures to be 
financed are implemented as, for example, in the case of the EAGGF, where 
Community financing takes the form of advances. 
This kind of prior monitoring by the Community departments can be based 
both on documents submitted and on on-the-spot investigations. 
Unfortunately these intensive monitoring procedures only take place some 
years after payments have been made, which detracts significantly from 
their effectiveness. 
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l'_. ___ J\_d_~t_ional monitoring in the Member States 
55. Since the Commission has final responsibility for implementing the Community 
budget, it must have the option of initiating additional monitoring itself, 
of taking part in the procedures or even carrying them out directly, if it 
has determined that some national monitoring has been inadequately applied. 
The relevant Legislation gives it this option, but the circumstances in 
which it applies unfortunately vary from sector to sector. 
56. In the EAGGF sector the Commission has extensive scope for carrying out 
these additional investigations. Its officials can carry out additional 
on-the-spot investigations, although the Member States must be informed 
of them in advance so as to allow national officials to take part in the 
monitoring procedures. The Commission has more than once proposed that 
its officials should be allowed to carry out monitoring procedures 
unannounced as a kind of quality control. The Council of Ministers has 
unfortunately not yet reached any decision on this. The central 
responsibility now Lies with it. The Commission also has the option of 
requiring the national authorities to conduct additional monitoring, in 
which its own officials can take part. 
57. In the sector of own-resources the Commission's authority is weaker. 
ALL it can basically do is to require the national authorities to 
carry out additional monitoring, with the right to take part in the 
procedures. Beyond this it can only call for additional documents in 
exceptional cases. 
C. Recovery of amounts owed <see Annex I) 
58. Here too, the basic authority Lies with the national departments. 
The Commission ensures that cooperation between the Member States is 
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59. 
such as to secure the best possible recovery of amounts owed or the refund 
of irregular payments. It must also guarantee that national departments 
fulfil all their commitments to the Community's interests. 
In the case of the EAGGF the Community basically carries the full con-
sequences of irregularities, except in cases where it can establish that 
the national authorities have acted irresponsibly, negligently or in 
1 
error. 
In the case of own resources the Member States are basically required to 
make estdblistlL>c reven..Je~avai lable to the Commission, unless circumstances of 
force majeure have prevented this revenue from being collected. 
The burden of proof in the case of the EAGGF lies therefore with the 
Commission but in the case of own-resources it lies with the Member 
States. Both systems have caused problems. 
Where the EAGGF is concerneJ the Commission has great difficulty in 
making it clear to ~he Membe\r States that they are responsible for 
irregularities and that they! owe any amounts outstanding. The 
European Court of Justice PtJts debts in this correction at between 
ECU 1.6 and ECU 7.5 million.\ 
I, 
1 
In the case of own resources\there have 
the Member States in the int,rpretation 
and 'force majeure'. 1 
! 
been major differences between 
of the terms '-established revenues' 
Problems also arise where th~ national courts hearing proceedings for 
I 
fraud against the Community b~dget obviously take a more indulgent 
view than they do of fraud ag~inst the national tax system. The 
Commission is however powerle~s to intervene in such cases. 
Refunds of wrongful payments are covered by the provisions of Article 9 
of Regulation 1697/79 
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Ill. Systematic organisation of measures to combat 
ir~~9-~!-~Q~~~ai!~-b~~~1 ____________________ _ 
60. Decentralization of implementation and monitoring of Community 
financial instruments means, in the first instance,that Community 
finances are generally as efficiently monitored as national 
financial operations. 
The second consequence however is that monitoring operations can 
only be carried out in accordance with the different procedures 
Laid down in each Member State, a situation that can Lead to 
inequities, and a re implemented in isolation from each other, 
a fact that obviously increases the danger of fraud against trans-
national financial instruments. Decentralization of monitoring is 
a political and technical necessity that cannot be called into 
question. Its disadvantages are however so fundamental that they 
must be thoroughly clarified jointly by the Commission and the 
Member States if the effectiveness of Community financial operations 
is to remain credible. 
61. The Community has already made several attempts to reduce the 
adverse effects on fraud control of this division of monitoring 
procedures. Some reforms have been implemented and have already 
produced satisfactory results. To achieve complete equity in this 
area however a number of other fundamental steps must be taken. There is 
often a Lack of national infrastructures, clearly defined res~xnsibilities and the 
necessary administration. 
On the other hand, the Community's interest in effective monitoring 
of its financial operations would be inadequately represented if 
Legislation were simply shaped according to the financial instruments. 
The relevant decisions are taken, in particular in the Council,SO as to 
secure a balance between national interests, and there is no intention 
of calling these into question on account of 'secondary' considerations 
such as the effectiveness of monitoring and the economic effectiveness 
of the operations. Procedures must be built in to ensure that the 
monitoring aspects are duly considered. 
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62. The present system has the following disadvantages, which obviously 
call for clariflcdtion: 
The transrtatlonal c..r.are;..ccer of many Community financial 
instruments has given rise to much tr~nsnational economic 
crime, with which the present decentralized investigation 
system is unable to cope. 
The irregularities and frauds against the Community budgets 
tend to be concentrated in certain countries, in particular 
countries where : 
a) the admini5trative structure is weaker, 
b) legal judgements are Less strict, 
c) the geographical Location favours fraud. 
In some countries investigation and punishment of frauds 
against the Community budget is less rigourous than in cases 
of national fraud. 
Countries that apply strict monitoring procedures feel 
themselves at a disadvantage compared with countries where 
monitoring is Looser, because a disproportionate burden is 
placed on their nationals. 
Many Community financial instruments, e.g. the monetary 
compensatory amounts, are an open provocation to fraud , 
nor is there a clear justification for their existence. 
The extradition laws of certain third countries have created 
conditions favourable to the growth of organised economic 
crime. 
63. To overcome these disadvantages a number of measures have already 
been taken, in particular concerning mutual assistance between 
the Member States and the Commission. Other Commission proposals have 
ueenunsuccessful however, because the Council and the Member States 
were not prepared to grant the necessary authority to the Community. 
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64. ln general, the overall impression has arisen that the Community 
is still n~t in a position to take responsibility for systematic 
efforts to combat fraud against the Community budget. After having 
constantly confronted this problem for four years, the Committee 
on Budgetary Control feels under an obligation to propose systematic 
reform of Legislation and administrative structures concerned in 
combating fraud • 
65. In 1976 the Commission proposed that fundamental Loopholes in the 
pursuit of frauds, such as the fact that offences committed in 
one Member State cannot automatically be brought to justice in 
the other Member States, or that Community funds are not treated 
as public monies in all Member States, should be closed by 
amendment to the Treaties. The problem of responsibilities of 
Community officials in cases of irregularities could also have 
been resolved. This reform should finally be implemented, and 
the Council of Ministers and the Member States must 
make an effort to reach a decision. Criminal law in the MenDer States must be 
harmonized if effective measures are to be taken against fraud. 
Under the Belgian Presidency, an ad-hoc working party considered 
a draft Agreement to amend the Treaties in terms of joint 
Legislation on the the matter of Legal protection of the 
Community's financial interests and of legal proceedings 
against infringements of the Treaties. Where the definition 
of irregularities concerning Community fundsis concerned, 
this legislation will make it possible for infringements to be 
brought to justice directly in any Member State. This is of 
major importance. 1 
66. Routine procedures show that conflicting interpretation by 
national authorities of such terms as 'force majeure', or 
'establishment of revenue' not only cause major problems in 
themselves, but also lead to inequities. This can even encourage 
irregularities. Procedures to harmonize these national 
interpretations should be concluded immediately. 
OJ C222, 22.9.1976 
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67. Experience has also shown that some national procedures 
are particularly effective and are clearly adapted to the 
peculiarities of the Community financial instrument, such 
as the law on the pursuit of fraud concerning subsidies in 
the Federal Republic of Germany (Paragraph 264 of the Penal 
Code). This experience should be applied at Community level. 
68. The Commission's responsibility for combating fraud and 
implementing monitoring procedures should as far as possible 
be standardized in all areas. The Commission's proposal to 
extend the procedure for combating frauds in the EAGGF sector 
to the own-resources sector (COM (79)11 final) should now 
be adopted by the Council. 
69. The Commission should have the option of conducting unannounced 
on-the-spot monitoring operations in the Member States and not 
only in the EAGGF sector, and not simply as a quality and control 
procedure, but also in cases where rapid action is needed to 
safeguard Community interests, as for example in relation to 
developments in the olive sector and in the fruit and vegetables 
sector. Here too the Commission should immediately submit relevant 
proposals to the Council, and the latter should take a decision at 
once. 
70. The Commission should have the option of establishing, jointly 
with the national departments responsible during current 
procedures in the Member States concerning frauds against the 
Community budget, whether all available resources have been 
devoted to investigation and pursuit. Any outstanding legal 
bases should be created at Community level. 
71. The Commission's establishment plans for pursuing and combating 
frauds bear no relations to the size of the task. The budgetary 
authority should approve the necessary establishment. 
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72. The Commission has begun to set up a system for the centralization, 
systematization and distribution of information on measures to 
combat fraud. These efforts should be continued, and the relevant 
departments should be allowed to acquire the necessary legal and 
staffing resources. A decision should also be taken as to whether 
these departments should have decision-making powers. 
73. If the Commission is given the option of carrying out unannounced 
monitoring procedures in the Member States, a 'flying squad' 
should be set up for these duties. 
C. Taking account of the monitoring aspects in drawing 
~Q-~Q~~~oi!~-l~9i~l~!iQo __________________________ _ 
74. The Commission regularly consults its Financial Controller before 
submitting any proposals on legislation concerning the different 
financial instruments. This procedure is inadequate however, 
because the decision is taken by the Council. A procedure 
should be established whereby the Court of Auditors would be 
empowered to draw attention to the monitoring aspects of such 
provisions. 
75. Experience has shown that a whole series of financial instruments 
are more or less ineffective and sometimes even harmful, such as 
monetary compensatory amounts. Financial instruments of this kind 
should be abolished. 
The Commission should, acting jointly with the Court of Auditors, 
draw up a list of measures 
whose instruments could be improved, 
that should simply be abolished, 
that are particularly conducive to fraud. 
D. Negotiations with third countries on the abolition of 
~i~f~~~!~of~~-!b~!_f~YQ~~-~fQOQ~if_fri~~-------------
76. Negotiations should be opened with countries who apply their 
extradition procedures in response to requests for extradition 
in such a way as to offer effective support to organised 
economic crime. 
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77. The problem has been summarised as follows 
Existing methods of collecting value added tax necessarily entail 
that the Member States in which tax evasion is a less significant 
problem are obliged to make a disproportionately high contribution 
to financing Community expenditure. Where a Member State pays too 
little into the joint kitty because its value-added-tax revenue 
has been reduced by tax evasion, the citizens of the other Member 
States must contribute correspondingly more. The taxpayer is 
penalised for being honest. 
78. This problem is more than just a question of the fair distribution 
of the burden of financing the Community among the different Member 
States. In as much as evasion of value added tax means a lower 
joint base for the calculation of own resources from VAT at the 
same time as the Brussels value-added rate is limited to a maximum 
of 1% of the base, this can only mean a reduction in the own-resources 
potential of the Community thereby aggravating existing problems of 
Community budget financing.1 
79. The Commission should, acting jointly with the national authorities 
and with the assistance of the Statistical Office, draw up estimates 
of the incidence of value-added-tax fraud in each Member State, on 
basis of which the budget estimates could be adjusted. 
80. The Commission should also complete the measures referred to in its 
answer to written question 1966/81 (Croux-Malangre-Notenboom)2. 
1 See info-rapid, 16.6.1981, p.96 
2 OJ C188, 22.7.1982, p.3 
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